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Abstract. Building on the work of Pierre Bourdieu and Maurice Merleau- 
Ponty we seek to open up traditional categories of thought surrounding  
the relation ‗body-organization‘ and elicit a thought experiment: What  
happens if we move the body from the periphery to the centre? We pass the  
interlocking theoretical concepts of object-body/subject-body and habitus  
through the theoretically constructed empirical case of ‗carnival dance‘ in  
order to re-evaluate such key organizational concepts as knowledge and  
learning. In doing so, we connect with an emerging body of literature on  
‗sensible knowledge‘; knowledge that is produced and preserved within  
bodily practices. The investigation of habitual appropriation in carnival  
dance also allows us to make links between repetition and experimentation,  
and reflect on the mechanism through which the principles of social 
organization,  
whilst internalized and experienced as natural, are embodied so  
that humans are capable of spontaneously generating an infinite array of  
appropriate actions. This perspective on social and organizational life,  
where change and permanence are intricately interwoven, contrasts sharply  
with the dominant view in organization studies which juxtaposes change/  
creativity and stability. Key words. body; Bourdieu; carnival; creativity;  
knowledge; learning; Merleau-Ponty  
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Must the life of the body be given up on, as the sheer unthinkable other of  
thought, or are its mysterious ways somehow mappable by intellection in  
what would then prove a wholly novel science, the science of sensibility  
itself? ... Nothing could be more disabled than a ruling rationality which  
can know nothing beyond its own concepts, forbidden from enquiring into  
the very stuff of passion and perception. How can the absolute monarch of  
Reason retain its legitimacy if what Kant called the ‗rabble‘ of the senses  
remains forever beyond its ken? (Eagleton, 1990:14)  
 
The Body as ‗Absent Present‘ in Organization Studies?  
 
Nietzsche famously suggested in the The Gay Science (1887) that all 
philosophy  
is, without knowing it, based on an understanding of the body, or  
rather on a misunderstanding of the body. He warned against the mistaken  
tendency to take grammar too seriously, allowing linguistic struc ture to  
shape or determine our understanding of the world and believing that the  
structure of language reflects a prior ontological reality (Barad, 2003). 
It is  
this what Eagleton is getting at in the epigraph to this paper. Yet, in 
studies  
of the social world and organization the existence of human bodies tends to  
be taken for granted and knowledge of the body mediated through abstract  
representations. Shilling (1993) thus describes attention to the body as an  
‗absent present‘ and emphasizes the particular difficulty of grasping the  
material body because its existence is permanently deferred behind the  
grids of meaning imposed by discourse. Gabriel (2003: 520) echoes this  
sentiment in a recent review of a book aimed at exploring the relationship  
between body and organization (Hassard et al., 2000), ‗Many contributions  
… while extolling the body, come close to losing it in a discursive din‘.  
Shilling (1993: 81) criticizes this ‗discursive essentialism‘ and claims 
that  
‗the body may be surrounded by and perceived through discourses, but it  
is irreducible to discourse‘. Whilst it can be beneficial to break down the  
limits between textual and contextual domains, there remains the need  
to be constantly suspicious about the extent to which broad domains of  
social being can be incorporated within the single conceptual domain of  
‗discourse‘ (Boje et al., 2004).  
 
The emphasis on discursive analysis has a number of important implications.  
It suggests that materiality can be seen as a product of language or  
some other form of cultural representation (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002),  
thus reducing the experiences within organizations to linguistic-semiotic  
ones and neglecting the multi-dimensional ways in which we experience  
reality. It also sustains a Cartesian ontology where the relation between  
subject and object is conceived of as holding between a disembodied and  
timeless subject and an external objective reality (Burkitt, 1998a). This  
leads to an ‗objectiv ist‘ conception of nature as an ‗in-itself‘ to which  
we, as subjects, have access only from the outside. This objective reality,  
which includes our own bodies and living matter in general, is seen as  
existing in an absolute space and time and as operating in accord ance with  
 
 
 
causal laws (Matthews, 2005). Yet, social scientists have now begun to tap  
into evidence from the life sciences which suggests that human beings  
record experiences and knowledge in ways that include much of the body  
besides the brain with skin, posture and gesture all implicated in the 
processing  
of information (Clark, 2003). In this context MacIntyre (1999: 8)  
observed that ‗Human identity is primarily, even if not only, bodily and  
therefore animal identity‘.  
 
In this paper we aim to develop an embodied view of organization that  
acknowledges the human body as a key entity. In doing so we build on  
the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Pierre Bourdieu who tried to 
construct  
in their own particular but interrelated ways1 a general theory of  
practice by exploring how perceptual habits are formed by the embodied  
person. We thus depart from the intellectualist, discursive view of 
organizations  
and bodies and discuss the human body‘s potential for generating  
creative and innovative practices. This means that embodied persons are  
not simply constructs, but they are ‗productive bodies‘ (Burkitt, 1999: 2)  
capable of activities that change the nature of their lives. Following  
Bourdieu and Merleau-Ponty, the body is to be understood as neither a  
biological nor a sociological category, but rather as point of overlapping  
between the physical, the symbolic and the sociological. Though it is  
widely acknowledged that the inscription of bodies is one of the primary  
functions of society, there still exists an urgent need to examine the use  
of the body in its immediate materiality and not simply as representation  
(Barad, 2003). As Merleau-Ponty (1964: 52) suggests, ‗We must rediscover  
a commerce with the world and a presence to the world which is older  
than intelligence‘.  
 
Two decades ago Cooper and Burrell (1988) already suggested that a  
lot of active and reactive organizational forces are focused on the body;  
be they biological, social or political. Indeed, it is the materiality of 
the  
body, the lived social organism in its physical expression that provides  
the perpetuum mobile for social life (Höpfl , 2003). What if we were thus  
to explore the silenced areas of the body as a spontaneous, experimental  
and creative force that challenges organized ways of life (Sørensen, 2006;  
Styhre, 2004) and the embodied desires that can disrupt, undermine and  
upset the homogeneity of organizational life (Linstead, 2000; Thanem,  
2006)? Much is to be gained by seeking to theorize what Grosz (1994) calls  
the ‗lived body‘ rather than simply looking into the techno-administrative  
use of bodies in organizations, and this is precisely what we aim to  
achieve by working through our ‗theoretically constructed empirical case‘2  
of carnival dance.  
 
Carnival Dance  
 
The origins and development of carnival present some of the most  
complex and interesting problems in the history of culture and scholarly  
attention to the subject has continued to grow. With carnival forms now  
 
 
 
being discussed across a range of disciplines, from criminology to cultural  
studies, carnival has become the touchstone for a variety of hotly debated  
topics like subversion, transgression and popular resistance to authority  
(Bernard-Donalds, 1998; Ivanov, 1984; Stallybrass and White, 1986).  
From an organizational perspective, ‗carnival‘, has been developing  
steadily as an emerging conceptual model and analytical category, yielding  
three main carnivalesque themes in organization studies (Boje, 2001;  
Rhodes, 2002, 2003): resistance (the tumultuous crowd), hierarchy (the  
world turned upside-down) and popular culture (the comic mask). In short,  
the carnival metaphor allows researchers to look into issues of power,  
hierarchy and order. In this sense carnival is not seen as an embodied 
event  
but as a mode of understanding. It provides scholars with the necessary  
conceptual toolkit to explore the tension between the apparent unmediated  
events of ‗real‘ carnival and its dependence on established codes, rules  
and conventions. We do not deny the efficacy of such textual 
representations  
of carnival and fully acknowledge the substantial contribution of  
this approach to the understanding and development of the concept, but  
we suggest that much can be gained by pursuing an alternative course.  
 
In what follows we will commit to a performative model of carnival  
in which basic terms and objects are forged in a manifold of actions and  
interactions. As Barad (2003: 802) puts it,  
 
A performative understanding of discursive practices challenges the 
representationalist  
belief in the power of words to represent pre-existing  
things … The move toward performative alternatives to representationalism  
shifts the focus from questions of correspondence between descriptions  
and reality (e.g. do they mirror nature or culture?) to matters of 
practices/  
doings/actions.  
 
A performative perspective suggests that there are important aspects of  
our research which cannot be put into words and escape the possibilities  
of language, without considering this necessarily a problem. Thus, as Law  
(2004: 88) suggests, ‗It might be perfectly appropriate to imagine 
representation  
in ways that wholly or partially resist explicit symbolisation‘.  
 
What we find particularly striking and compelling about the carnivalesque  
event is its treatment of the human body. At any time in history carnival  
consistently has taken its energy from the human bodily capacity to 
overflow  
its own limits and to refuse confinement (Bakhtin, 1984). Carnival  
bodies are open to the world, and the emphasis is placed on the body parts  
that stretch out into it (Gardiner, 1998). Carnival rejects the tradition 
where  
the body is seen as a property of a subject, who is thereby dissociated 
from  
carnality and makes decisions and choices about how to dispose of the  
body and its powers. The carnival body is a communal body contained in  
the collective mass of the people, not the biological individual (Burkitt,  
1998b). In carnival the body is valuable precisely because it is not a 
closed  
unity. It violates the boundaries between self and other, self and the 
world.  
Furthermore, the carnival body represents hybridisation, a co-mingling  
 
 
 
of incompatible elements, and questions the formation of social groups  
through inclusion and exclusion (Stallybrass and White, 1986).  
 
In the organizational world those parts and aspects of the body which  
are publicly celebrated in carnival culture have become privatized and  
experienced as sources of embarrassment. Sexual life, giving birth, death,  
eating and drinking have turned into private acts and lost their public,  
symbolic content. That is, they have become what we refer to today as  
‗body functions‘, the by-products of the bodily machine, and as such they  
have lost their meaningful place in the cycles and rituals of public life.  
Bodies here have acquired an individual nature, one that is closed off  
to the world and complete within itself. Thus, rather than on the open  
and unfinished body, accent is placed on its sealed and fi nished nature.  
The emphasis is put on the body parts that create the boundaries—its  
skin, smooth surfaces, musculature and, in particular, the face and eyes  
(Schroeder, 2004). Bodily surfaces demarcate social and personal limits  
and identities are formulated through the experience of a self that is 
closed  
and literally self-possessed (Michelson, 1999). In other words, the body  
has become what Merleau-Ponty (1962) designated as an ‗object-body‘.  
 
Subject-Body and Object-Body  
 
Merleau-Ponty explored in the Phenomenology of Perception (1962)  
how human beings as subjects are essentially embodied, so that their  
being is ‗in -the-world‘. Influenced by Freud and psychoanalysis, Merleau- 
Ponty argued for the body as the agent of experience and the basis for  
all knowledge. He was concerned primarily with mapping the various  
manifestations of embodiment in terms of relation between perceiving  
subject and perceived world (Gardiner, 1998) and prioritized practical  
over reflective forms of being, seeing intentionality manifested in our 
immediate  
perceptions, feelings and actions, rather than our refl ective  
thoughts. For Merleau-Ponty the human body is a part of nature, but a very  
special part because of the human possession of speech (logos). Our own  
bodies are thus no longer seen as objects but as relations to the 
surrounding  
world, which in turn is defined by its relation to us as embodied and 
active  
beings (Eagleton, 2004). An embodied being is thus necessarily actively  
involved with, and inseparable from, its surrounding world (Matthews,  
2005). This is expressed in Merleau-Ponty‘s doctrine that it is our bodies  
themselves which are the subjects of experience.  
 
Merleau-Ponty (1962) used the conceptual categories of ‗subject-body‘  
and ‗object-body‘ to develop his position. The subject-body is the body we  
live from within, understanding it immediately. This body is a basis for  
our action; it is always present. In spite of this, or because of this, we 
stay  
unaware of its presence. In the object-body, ‗we have the body‘. That is,  
as long as we remain the subject-body, there is only a potential separation  
between the body and ourselves, because our bodies are not objectifi ed.  
The object-body, however, divides the body and us by giving the body  
 
 
a sense of exteriority. We become observers who have bodies, bodies to  
which we stand in a relation of possession. Our body is therefore both the  
subject that is doing the touching as well as the object that is being 
touched.  
For Merleau-Ponty the body is neither an internal nor an external 
projection.  
Things are the extension of our bodies and our bodies are the  
extension of the world; through our bodies the world surrounds us. In other  
words, Merleau-Ponty transforms the concepts of interiority and exteriority  
into the indeterminate surfaces of a Möebius strip. It is particularly  
diffi cult to grasp what the body actually is, not only because our body is  
so close to us but also because of the complex relation of dependence 
between  
the subject-body and the object-body:  
 
Neither subject nor object can be conceived as cores, atoms, little nuggets  
of being, pure presence: not bounded unified entities, they interpenetrate,  
they have a fundamental openness to each other … They are interlaced  
one with the other not externally but through their reversibility and  
exchangeability, their similarity-in-difference and their difference-
insimilarity.  
(Grosz, 1994: 43)  
 
The Body Dances  
 
To give some texture to our theoretical exposition we will look at a 
particular  
version of Afro-Brazilian carnival dance: the samba. We intend to  
show how samba can provide us with an understanding of the possibility  
of a corporeal intelligence: thinking with/through the entire body. As we  
are not dance scholars, we have chosen Rector (1984) and Browning (1995)  
as our guides into the world of samba, both because of their impressive  
knowledge of it and because of their personal experience dancing and  
teaching Brazilian dance.  
 
The word samba comes from Angola and the Congo, meaning a navel-tonavel  
bump into another person. Samba was also originally synonymous  
to the word ‗batuque‘ (beat). It designated neither the type of music nor a  
particular rhythm, but the act of dancing. Among the six to eight million  
black people who came to Brazil, corporeal expression manifested itself  
through the tribal dance without any established rules. At the onset samba  
was a dance, liberating one from fear, bringing one person maximally close  
to another (everything was drawn into the zone of free familiar contact),  
with its play and its joyful relativity. There was no onlooker, no dominant  
idea, and no judgment. The dancers were completely embedded in the  
wonder of movement. Samba was movement performed by the body as  
an end in itself. The artistic logic of the dance ignored the closed, 
smooth  
and impenetrable surface of the body, and retained only its sensuous and  
instinctual characteristics. Understanding the world through carnival  
dance did not imply choice, as a fundamental feature, but rather habitual  
action.  
 
The rhythm of samba was so catchy that it was gradually absorbed by all  
black people and later by white people. Samba became a mix of Angolan  
 
 
 
samba, European polka, African batuques, with touches of Cuban habanera  
and other styles. Over time a number of organizational principles got 
introduced  
in the dance (Rector, 1984):  
 
1. The law of repetition: in the dance, movements are basically the 
variation  
of the same samba step;  
2. The law of contrast: in spite of repetition, the monotony is broken by  
a greater emphasis being placed upon some of these movements;  
3. The law of chain reaction: like a ball of yarn, dancers unroll the 
thread  
linearly in a progressive series of movements.  
At a later stage of the dance development external actions and interactions  
became the focus. The samba parade evolved into a real spectacle.  
The introduced element of judgment and competition enhanced the object  
characteristics of the body (the object-body is itself an instrument and 
the  
end of our actions). At this stage the dance represented two different 
forms  
of movement: ‗concrete‘ movement and ‗abstract‘ movement. In concrete  
movement the dancer is conscious of her bodily space as the matrix of her  
habitual action, but not as an objective setting; her body is at her 
disposal  
as a means to create a movement, but not yet as the means of expression of  
symbolic meanings. In this movement the dancer is the body, and her body  
is the potentiality of a certain world. In the abstract movement there is 
an  
awareness of an objective, this movement is very much borne on by that  
awareness. It is triggered off by this objective, but it is clearly 
centrifugal,  
shaping a clear ‗intention which has reference to one‘s own body, making  
an object of it‘ (Merleau-Ponty, 2004: 113). This new body gains a power  
of projection and representation. Once again the body becomes an object,  
an instrument but in a rather different sense, as an immense and intricate  
living system of meanings. The originally formed concrete movement is  
supplemented by abstract movement, which, from its side, goes inward, 
discovering  
outward-bound patterns of meaning. Together, these two types  
of movement ‗wrap up‘ the process of subject/object-body relationship,  
‗granting to the human being the feeling of being able to fully inhabit the  
world, understand it, and constantly orientate itself within it‘ (Kujundzic  
and Buschert, 1994: 212).  
 
What is striking and original about samba carnival dance is that it is  
not simply an example of a subject-object relation of dependence, nor  
simply a metaphor of inversion setting the object-body in the place of the  
subject-body while preserving the binary structure of the division between  
them. In carnival dance it is precisely the purity of this distinction 
which  
is transgressed. The object-body invades the field of the subject-body,  
blurring the hierarchical imposition of order; creating the triumph of one  
aesthetic over another, making the subject open up to be completed by  
the world—things, others, and interrelations. It reveals the dependency of  
the object-body on the subject-body and vice versa, showing the 
inextricably  
mixed and unarticulated (but not unintelligible) nature of the background  
which is made up of ‗practices‘, ‗capacities‘ or ‗stances‘. In carnival 
dance,  
 
 
no body enjoys an absolute privilege inasmuch as each must be and is 
continually  
tested and retested with respect to another. Carnival dance stages  
the dialogue between bodies.  
 
Since there are no rigid boundaries between subject-body and object- 
body, the body constantly establishes the range of that boundary within  
its own ‗economy‘. In ordinary life this establishment normally leads to  
habitual appropriation. In other words, human action uses paths that  
naturally follow the physiognomy of things and situations that decipher  
the shapes and messages of the world and past human experience. Habitual  
appropriation involves a modification and enlargement of the corporeal  
schema, an incorporation of new principles of action and know-how that  
permit new ways of acting and understanding: ‗It is a sediment of past  
activity that remains alive in the present in the form of the structures of  
the corporeal schema; shaping perception, conception, deliberation,  
emotion, and action‘ (Crossley, 2001: 104). Habitual appropriation consists  
of broad forms of competence and a practical, pre-discursive grasp or  
understanding of the world. Merleau-Ponty (1962) argues that habit is not  
a mechanical response and is not acquired in a mechanical fashion, but  
neither is it a reflective or intellectual phenomenon. It is a phenomenon  
that forces us to abandon each of these false alternatives in favour of a  
more existential focus upon our simultaneously meaningful and embodied  
manner of being-in-the-world, a phenomenon on which thought depends.  
As Burkitt (1998a: 68) puts it: ‗Thought is not structured by anything  
that could be considered as a ‗mind‘ which is somehow distinct from the  
body, whether this is a set of cognitive structures or categories, or 
innate  
ideas. Instead, it is learned bodily actions or habits which make thought  
possible‘.  
 
Body—Habitus—Field  
 
This brings us to Bourdieu‘s notion of ‗habitus‘. Habitus is a Latin word,  
which refers to a habitual or typical condition, state or appearance, 
particularly  
of the body (Jenkins, 1992). Bourdieu retains some of the concept‘s  
original meanings in his defi nition:  
 
Habitus is the durable and transposable systems of schemata of perception,  
appreciation, and action that result from the institution of the social  
in the body. It contributes to constituting the field as a meaningful 
world, a  
world endowed with sense and value, in which it is worth investing one‘s  
energy. (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 99)  
 
Bourdieu sees habitus as an integrated whole of dispositions which 
constitutes  
a living presence, a cohesive living actuality and potential (1990:  
102–104). The dispositions and generative classifi catory schemes which  
are the essence of the habitus are thus embodied in real human beings. It  
is because the body has become a repository of ingrained dispositions that  
certain actions, certain ways of behaving and responding, seem altogether  
natural. Habitus can thus be considered as a certain durable organization  
 
 
 
of one‘s body and of its deployment in the world. It exists as behavioural  
manners, and is manifested though its effects. The practical schemes  
through which the body is organised are the product of history and, at the  
same time, the source of practices and perceptions, which reproduce that  
history. Experiences will tend to confirm habitus, because most people  
are bound to encounter circumstances that tend to agree with those that  
originally fashioned their habitus. Habitus is also described by Bourdieu  
as ‗the generative principle of regulated improvisations‘ (1990: 57), which  
points us more directly towards the potential of a socialized body to  
respond to, to be a part of, a surrounding world. Habitus changes with each  
sequence or iteration, in a direction which attempts a compromise with  
material conditions. However, the compromise is inevitably biased, as the  
perception of objective conditions is itself engendered and fi ltered 
through  
the habitus. Particular practices or perceptions should thus be seen, not  
as the product of habitus as such, but as the product of the relation 
between  
habitus and the specific social contexts or fields within which individuals  
act. A field is a social arena within which struggles or manoeuvres take  
place over specific resources or stakes and access to them. Dispositions 
are  
acquired in social positions within a fi eld and imply a subjective 
adjustment  
to that position. The relation which obtains between habitus and the  
field to which it is objectively adjusted is a sort of ontological 
complicity,  
a subconscious and pre-refl exive fit. This complicity manifests itself in  
what Bourdieu calls the sens pratique (or ‗feel for the game‘), an 
intentionality  
without intention which functions as the principle of strategies  
devoid of strategic design, without the conscious positing of ends. This  
sens pratique is what allows habitus to generate an infinity of strategies  
which are adapted to an endless number of possible situations (Mahar,  
1990). Habitus becomes active only in relation to a field and depending  
upon the stimuli and structure of the field, can generate different, even  
opposite, outcomes (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992).  
 
Carnival Dance and ‗Le Sens Pratique‘  
 The sens pratique precognizes: it reads in the present state the possible  
future states with which the field is pregnant. The logic of practice is 
logical  
to the point where to be logical would cease being practical. (Bourdieu  
and Wacquant, 1992: 23)  
 
Samba can be seen as a combination of routine, habitual movement,  
play and improvisation, without explicit reference to any codifi ed 
knowledge,  
and without every dancer necessarily ‗knowing what they are doing‘  
(in the sense of being able to adequately explain what they are doing). In  
samba one has no choice but to think with the body. This reveals itself  
in samba music which is a polymeter. The interest of polymetric music is in  
the simultaneous patterns which are established in a single measure. So  
each player has to concentrate on her part though the dancer can make  
reference to all of them with different parts of her body. Browning (1995)  
 
 
 
has noted that the only way to understand a polymeter is by knowing how  
to dance it. The strong beat in samba is suspended, the weak accentuated.  
This suspension leaves the body with a need that can only be satisfi ed by  
filling the silence with different motion. Samba, the dance, cannot exist  
without the suppression of a strong beat. The dancer is able to accommodate  
more simultaneous rhythms than the individual musician by using different  
parts of her body, creating totality through fragmentation. This  
‗thinking with the body‘ manifests itself in what we call ‗feel for the 
dance‘.  
It lacks the intentional action shaping the resulting totality; the total  
outcome is anything but the sum of total intentions at the level of 
dancers.  
The dancers situate themselves within ‗real activity as such‘, that is, in  
the practical relation to the world, which directly governs their movements  
(Morris, 2001). Dancers possess a practical mastery of the implicit  
principles of the dance, not just the knowledge of explicit, consciously  
recognized rules.  
 
According to Bourdieu, developing this sens pratique does not entail  
learning an arbitrary set of rules, but rather listening to one‘s body. 
Carnival  
dance is strongly informed by historical learning and treats the body as a  
‗living memory pad, an automation that leads the mind subconsciously  
along with it‘ (Bourdieu, 1990: 68). Unlike the logic of discourse, which  
functions by making the work of thought explicit in a linear series of 
signs,  
the sens pratique is pre-reflexive. This logic of practice ensures the 
order  
and continuity of any form of organization (Gherardi, 2000). The active  
presence of the past tends to guarantee the structure of dance practices 
and  
their constancy over time more reliably than all formal rules and explicit  
norms could do. The body enacts both tradition and ritual in the dance  
form. It does not represent what it performs; it does not simply memorize  
the past but enacts it, bringing the past back to life and thus offering a 
prospect  
for sensuous or ‗sensible‘ knowledge.  
 
Stability and Change in Carnival Dance  
 
There are a number of organizational principles that ensure the internal  
logic and the integrity of the dance from both the external point of view  
(among different dancers) and internally (within a certain individual  
dancer). Samba movements are not choreographed, their nature is habitual:  
simple forward and backward steps and tilting, rocking body movements.  
Dancers unroll the thread linearly in a progressive series of steps 
(Rector,  
1984) but samba is not just comprised of the steps. The wholeness and 
expressiveness  
of the dance come from postures, gestures and facial expressions.  
Samba contains numerous elements that are derived from everyday  
life and are thus shared by a society as a whole. Postures and gestures,  
Bourdieu argues, are highly charged with social meaning and values, and  
although they are learned they seem so fundamental they are most often  
perceived as natural. Gestures in dance can be understood as a mode of  
homologization by means of which practices are ordered across time and  
 
 
 
space. The dance structures are inverted as they are interiorized, and 
where  
dancing flips over again in exteriorizing itself in the form of dance 
practices  
that have the deceptive appearance of being free improvisation. It is  
indeed the tradition, as a silent and determining memory of samba, which  
situates dancers‘ bodies in space and time, thus defining the lines and  
fi gures of the dance. Samba is known for its incorporation of fi gures 
that  
flash across time. Dance ethnography has often referred to such fi gures as  
African or indigenous ‗survivals‘—gestures that can be traced or inferred  
to pre-slavery and pre-colonial sources (Browning, 1995).  
 
Carnival dance is not just a ‗concentrated‘ example of the expressive  
nature of embodiment. In carnival, the term ‗dance‘ refers to a larger 
sense  
of a social field where collective body, power and history are celebrated 
by  
members of a community. ‗Body in carnival‘ is also the body informed by  
a set of social beliefs; it is the body of a social ideologeme that has 
been  
fused with its own discourse. Within a field of carnival there is more than  
a single modality of existence. It is a realm of unspoken and unarticulated  
embodied practices conceived under the impact of habitus. They provide  
the basic grid or meta-dispositions towards ways of perceiving, knowing  
and appreciating the world. The power of the unspoken in carnival dance  
derives from the thoughtlessness of habit and habituation, rather than  
consciously learned rules and principles. Though the meaning of the  
carnival for each dancer is constructed from the vantage of their uniquely  
embodied viewpoint and hence is irreducibly pluralistic, the dancers  
continue to inhabit the same social field. The meaning and social effi cacy  
of carnival dance is determined both within that given field and in a 
network  
of hierarchical relations with other fields. With an understanding  
of the entire structure of relationships that define positions in the fi 
eld  
of carnival, and with the knowledge of its interactions with other social  
fields, it becomes possible to answer the question of whether carnival, and  
carnival dance in particular, is capable of acting as a force in re-
evaluating  
the role of the body in social processes, in re-assessing how people‘s 
experiences  
of, and responses to, social structures are shaped by their sensory  
and sensual selves (Schilling, 1993). The whole development of the  
dance—disintegration/unification among dancers and differentiation  
as the result of their competitive impulses—can have direct signifi cance  
for the change in their habitus, the provisional result of which is new 
improvised  
choreography/steps/ figures. Consideration of these mechanisms  
of integration and differentiation is also relevant to an understanding of  
how habitus works. Corporeal expression is generally unconscious,  
fashioned by habitus and may often contradict voluntary expression. At  
this point the corporeal becomes open to contestation and active 
reinterpretation,  
generating the possibility of drawing it into social discourse.  
Carnival dance is a particular form of social interweaving which possesses  
the compelling force that pushes through its tension to a specifi c change  
and so to other forms of intertwining and interacting. Carnival dance  
shows that the change in habitus characteristic of the dance is subject  
 
 
 
to a quite specific order and direction, although it was not planned by  
individual dancers or produced by purposeful effort. The choreography  
of the carnival dance is not intentional/imposed; any more that it is 
unintentional/ 
irrational. It is developed through the autonomous dynamics  
of a web of dancers‘ relationships. Though habitus has an ‗infi nite 
capacity  
for generating practices‘ (Bourdieu, 1990: 55), the limits to these 
practices  
are still set by the socially situated conditions of its production. The 
conditioned  
and conditional freedom habitus provides, removes any possibility  
of totally chaotic creation. On the one hand habitus provides carnival 
dance  
with numerous possibilities, freedoms and opportunities. On the other  
hand, it is the habitus that so clearly defines impossibilities, 
necessities,  
and prohibitions inscribed in the objective conditions.  
 
Concluding Connections and Reflections  
 
Experience stands in ineluctable opposition to knowledge and to the kind  
of instruction that follows from general theoretical or technical 
knowledge.  
(Gadamer, 1960/1982: 355)  
 
We suggested at the start of this paper we intended to move the body 
centre- 
stage through the theoretically constructed empirical case of carnival 
dance.  
We borrow the notion of ‗theoretically constructed empirical case‘ from  
Bourdieu (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 160) and prefer this to that of  
metaphor. We see it as a way of bringing to the fore theoretical 
connections,  
of thinking differently about organization, rather than exploring the 
various  
ways in which what goes on in carnival dance is analogous to what goes  
on in (work) organizations (without necessarily having to change the way  
we actually think about organizations). Whilst we hope to have developed  
in the reader a general awareness that ‗the sens pra tique of organizing is  
inscribed in the bodies and in the habitus of prac tices‘ (Gherardi, 2000:  
216), it still behoves us to elucidate the implications of our analysis for  
organizational life and theory.  
 
As indicated in our abstract, in this paper we put to work key analytical  
concepts from Pierre Bourdieu and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. It would be  
an understatement to suggest that attention to their body of work in 
mainstream  
organization and management studies has been limited. Merleau- 
Ponty especially has been largely ignored [Küpers (2005) and Strati (2007)  
being two notable exceptions] and when mentioned his work often merits  
little more than a passing reference to ‗the body‘ or ‗perception‘. 
Although  
the work of Bourdieu is getting increased recognition in mainstream debates  
in recent years—for example, Battilana‘s (2006) use of his 
conceptualization  
of fields; Mutch‘s (2003) application of his concept of habitus; and  
Özbilgin and Tatli‘s (2005) extensive review essay—this often happens  
in a way that picks up concepts such as field and habitus divorced from  
their relational context (Mutch et al., 2006) and that ignores Bourdieu‘s  
commitment to the empirical domain as the source of his theoretical and  
 
 
 
philosophical project (Özbilgin and Tatli, 2005). As these approaches,  
almost without exception, pay little attention to the issue of embodiment,  
it should come as little surprise they fi nd the concept of habitus 
‗vague‘,  
leaving little room for learning and social change (Battilana, 2006), and  
tending ‗towards a sense fatalism and an inevitable reproduction of  
existing patterns of thought and action‘ (Mutch, 2003: 397). However,  
once we start filling out the concept of habitus empirically and relation- 
ally it proves to be anything but ‗fatalistic‘. As Gherardi and Nicolini  
(2000: 332) pointed out, for Bourdieu the knowledge contained in habitus  
is primarily a ‗competence-to-act‘ and is deeply rooted in individual and  
collective identity and practices. The knowledge captured in the habitus  
is not simply something people have, rather it is better regarded as 
something  
that they do (Blackler, 1995).  
 
Our work, then, aims to provide a counterbalance to the dominant 
disciplinary  
discourse on knowledge and learning which was so succinctly  
captured by Blackler (1995: 1022): ‗in place of a strong reliance on 
knowledge  
located in bodies and routines … emphasis is increasingly falling  
on the knowledge that is located in brains, dialogue and symbols‘. Yet  
this dominant view has been attacked in phenomenological philosophy  
as ‗unrealistic‘, since the kind of transcending of experience required for  
such ‗knowledge‘ is in principle impossible in human affairs (Gadamer,  
1982). Carnival dance precisely offers a form of organization (admittedly  
well beyond the traditional boundaries of the work place) and knowing  
which is dynamic, concrete and relational. Participants in carnival dance  
learn by engaging with others in an ongoing practice whilst modifying  
their relations to all the others and contributing to the overall dance, 
thus  
demonstrating that knowledge is a socio-cultural phenomenon which is  
not acquired piecemeal by individuals but involves ‗the development of  
a new identity based on participation in the system of situated practices‘  
(Gherardi and Nicolini, 2002: 194). This helps us move beyond what Cook  
and Brown (1999: 381) call the ‗epistemology of possession‘, which treats  
knowledge as something people possess (in their heads), thus privileging  
the individual and the explicit, and facilitating its commodifi cation.  
Guided by Bourdieu and Merleau-Ponty, our reading of the organization  
of carnival dance gives us some insights into what concrete forms an 
‗epistemology  
of practice‘, to use Cook and Brown‘s terminology, might take.  
The knowledge expressed in carnival dance does not strive for intellectual  
control over objects (or subjects) such that they can no longer ‗talk  
back‘ and surprise us. It offers what Strati (1999, 2007) called ‗sensible  
knowledge‘; a knowledge which generates dialectical relations with  
action and which opposes descriptions that neglect the corporeality of  
human experience in organizations:  
 
Sensible knowledge is directed towards ‗sensible‘ worlds. That is, it is a 
form  
of knowing-and acting-profoundly diverse from the knowledge gathered  
and produced through the logical and ratiocinative cognitive faculty  
directed towards ‗intelligible‘ worlds … it does not restrict such 
knowledge  
 
 
 
to the mere direct, physical and objectively observable relation; instead, 
it  
accounts for the subject‘s intimate, personal and corporeal relation with  
the experience of the world. (Strati, 2007: 62)  
 
Strati went on to explore three concrete examples (labelled ‗with the  
hands‘, ‗with the ‗feet‘ and ‗with the ear‘) of such ‗sensible knowledge‘,  
demonstrating how people adopt bodily movements and postures appropriate  
to working within a particular organizational space and make these  
habitual by work practice.  
 
Our own exploration of habitual appropriation in carnival dance allowed  
us to make links between repetition and experimentation, thus  
showing how routine and improvization, tradition and creativity, are  
utterly intertwined. Those who possess a superior knowledge of dance  
forms were seen as repositories of tradition. Dance technique is understood  
by the dancers as an integral part of the lives of bodies in the 
communities  
that have produced dance tradition, yet the choreography of the samba is  
characterized by individual creativity and by no other fixed rule that all  
that the sambista feel must be expressed with the body. Though the dance  
is in many ways predetermined by dancers‘ habitus, it does not mean that  
through the practice of dancing something new cannot be created. For it  
is in conjunction with habitus that the dynamics of dancers‘ interaction  
leads towards new developments in existing group and individual structures.  
We can trace parallels here with Cook and Brown‘s (1999: 397–398)  
study of a group of design teams at Xerox for whom interacting with old  
artifacts is a source of insights in designing new technologies. The design  
teams explored how the mechanisms ‗sound, feel, and work together‘,  
thus regenerating those particular bits of knowledge associated with a  
particular competency. These cases are ways of responding to what Bilton  
(2007: xv) calls ‗the challenge of creativity in management … to overcome  
these stereotypes of novelty and continuity‘. As such it adds a timely (or  
perhaps ‗untimely‘?) alternative perspective to the discourse surrounding  
creativity and change management, a discourse which offers ‗little evidence  
of critique or genuinely alternative voices‘ (Sturdy and Grey, 2003:  
652). Precisely because of their unchallenged uniformity, discourses of  
change and creativity are in danger of being emptied out of all meaning  
(Rehn and De Cock, in press). If we pay attention to ‗sensible knowledge‘,  
how people ‗create, invent and enact organization, doing so not as 
individual  
yet interrelated ‗minds‘ but through their corporeality‘ (Strati,  
2007: 66), the taken-for-granted grounding of such concepts as creativity,  
innovation and change starts to look like just so many assumptions, created  
to fit nicely in with other assumptions. Perhaps we may even come to  
realize that our familiar theories of organization and the world fi t 
together  
so snugly, less because we have found out how the world is than because  
we have tailored each to the other?  
 
In developing our perspective in opposition to dominant perspectives  
on knowledge and learning, we have remained true to the wider projects of  
 
 
 
both Merleau-Ponty and Bourdieu of creating an epistemological break—a  
break with familiar conceptions of the world (Matthews, 2005; Özbilgin  
and Tatli, 2005). Our final aim is precisely to create new openings, new  
ways of thinking about the body and organizing—other recent examples  
are offered by Sørensen (2006) and Thanem (2006)—and we hope that  
our work, constrained as it is by its particular subject matter, may 
provide  
the stimulus/platform for researchers to apply some of our interpretations  
in other, perhaps less explicitly body-centred, social and organizational  
settings.  
 
Notes  
 
1 For example, Bourdieu said in an interview that he borrowed a way to 
analyse  
the relation between individual practice and the world that was neither 
intellectualistic  
nor mechanistic from Merleau-Ponty (Mahar, 1990: 34).  
 
2 As Bourdieu put it emphatically: ‗I think that one cannot think well 
except in  
and through theoretically constructed empirical cases‘ (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant,  
1992: 160).  
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